Full Story and Impact on Indian Strategic and Foreign Policy
By Prof (Dr) Ratnesh Dwivedi, Awarded Academic/Sec/Intel/Def Expert and
Journalist
ratnesh.dwivedi@yahoo.com
Indian Airlines
Flight 814, commonly known as IC 814, was an Indian Airlines Airbus A300 that
was hijacked by five members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen on 24 December 1999.
The passenger flight from Kathmandu to Delhi was taken over by the terrorists
at around 16:53 IST, shortly after entering Indian airspace. There were 190
people on board the aircraft, including 179 passengers and 11 crew members
including Captain Devi Sharan, First Officer Rajinder Kumar and Flight Engineer
Anil Kumar Jagia.
The aircraft flew to several places including Amritsar, Lahore and Dubai. In Dubai,
the hijackers released 27 passengers including a seriously injured male hostage
who was stabbed multiple times by the hijackers. Later, on December 25, the
hijackers forced the plane to land in Kandahar, Afghanistan. At that time, much
of Afghanistan, including the Kandahar airport where the hijacked plane landed,
was under Taliban control. Taliban men had surrounded the plane and the
presence of two officers of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence made any
external intervention difficult. The hijackers radioed the captain that they
had only one hour of fuel left and that the Pakistani ATC had refused to allow
them to land in Lahore. He made further calls to the ATC, requesting them to
contact Pakistan and obtain permission to land, as the hijackers did not want
to land in India and had already threatened to kill ten hostages if their
demands were not met. At 6:30 pm, the Indian High Commission in Pakistan
requested permission for the plane to land there, but was denied. At 18:25 IST,
the CMG informed the National Security Guard (NSG) to be ready for a possible
rescue operation.
Upon being told that there was not enough fuel to go further, the hijackers
allowed the captain to land the plane at Amritsar airport. At 18:44 IST,
following a message relayed by the captain to the Indian ATC, the flight began
its descent towards the airport in Amritsar and the CMG was informed. Indian
Home Minister LK Both Advani and Punjab state's Director General of Police
Sarabjit Singh later said that they learned from the hijacking from television,
not from the CMG As per guidelines, Singh asked the Inspector General of Police
of the region to take charge of the situation .
At 19:10 IST, the NSG was ready to fly to Amritsar, but had to wait as
government negotiators did not arrive. On landing in Amritsar, the captain
requested immediate refueling for the plane. The hijackers had refused to
communicate with local police officials while the plane was in Amritsar. Later
accounts indicated that the hijackers, upset at the delay in refueling, stabbed
Satnam Singh, a German national, and Rupin Katiyal, an Indian, with knives,
causing multiple wounds. The captain contacted the ATC four times, telling them
that the hijackers were armed with Kalashnikov rifles and had begun killing hostages,
and requested them to refuel the plane as quickly as possible to prevent any
additional deaths. Captain Sharan later said that he hoped that with the
assistance of the Indian government, the crisis would end and the plan would
not have to take off from Amritsar again.
Meanwhile, the CMG directed officials to ensure that the plane was immobilized
at any cost and armed personnel of the Punjab Police were deployed to ensure
this. The aircraft's engines were kept running and the plane remained on the
runway. Eventually a refueling bowser was dispatched, but it was initially
parked on the side. As the plane moved forward, the aircraft was ordered to
stop taking off and it narrowly missed hitting the aircraft. The then National
Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra later revealed that the government had asked
for a sniper to be hidden in the bowser, who could fire to disable the aircraft
if needed. Later, it was revealed that this approach caused the hijackers to
suspect that the refueling process would prevent their departure, and they
ordered Captain Sharan to take off immediately, resulting in the plane narrowly
avoiding hitting a fuel tanker on the runway. The hijackers threatened to kill
more hosts if the plan did not take off immediately. The Captain later said
that he had to make a decision to prevent the passengers from being killed.
Despite not receiving any clearance to take off, the plane took off from
Amritsar at 19:47 IST. Captain Sharan announced the departure to the ATC,
saying, "We are all dying." The NSG took off from Delhi at around
19:55 IST and arrived at the airport at 20:15 IST, after the plane had taken
off. On approach to Lahore, the plan again sought permission to land, which was
denied by the Pakistani ATC. All lights and navigational aids at Lahore airport
were switched off to prevent a forced landing. Since the plane had not been
refueled at Amritsar, it was running out of fuel and Captain Sharan indicated
that they would have to crash-land the plane. As he proceeded to land on the highway,
the Pakistani ATC turned on the navigational aids and allowed the plane to land
at the airport. The plane landed in Lahore at 20:01 IST. On receiving
information that the plane had landed in Lahore, India sought transportation
for the Indian High Commissioner G. Parthasarathy from Islamabad to Lahore and
requested Pakistani authorities to ensure that the plane did not leave Lahore.
The runway lights were again turned off and the Pakistani army surrounded the
plane to prevent the plane from taking off.
According to Captain Sharan, the hijackers were ready to release some
of the women and children on board the plane, but Pakistani authorities did not
allow them to. Parthasarathy later said that he kept requesting Pakistan to
prevent the plane from taking off, but was not listened to and was also delayed
due to transport difficulties. By the time it reached the airport, the plane was
refueled and allowed to depart. The plane took off from Lahore at around 22:32
IST. Indian officials contacted Pakistan to confirm reports of casualties on
board the plane, but did not receive any response from Pakistani authorities.
On departure from Lahore, the crew was asked to set a route to Kabul. However,
since there were no night landing facilities at Kabul airport at the time, the
captain expressed his inability to do so. As the plane flew westwards, most
Gulf countries closed their airspace to prevent the plane from landing. The
plane was finally allowed to land at Al Minhad Air Base in Dubai and landed at
1:32 IST the next day. After negotiations between UAE authorities and the
hijackers, 27 passengers were released in exchange for fuel. The body of a
seriously injured 25-year-old male hostage Katyal, who had been stabbed to
death earlier, was also recovered. The released passengers also included Satnam
Singh, who had been attacked by the hijackers in Amritsar, and Katyal's body
was later brought to India on 25 December by a special relief flight.
When the plane was in Dubai, Indian authorities wanted to attempt a rescue by
the Indian Army, but UAE authorities refused to allow it. UAE authorities sent
catering trucks to delay the plane further, but the hijackers forced the
Captain to take off and the plane narrowly missed the runway. Captain Sharan
later said that he could have opted to crash the plane to prevent it from
taking off, but that he would have posed a risk of fire as the plane was full
of fuel and he could not have done so without the explicit permission of the
authorities. The plane later took off from Dubai at 6:20 am IST.
The plane landed at Kandahar airport at 8:33 am IST. Kandahar was under the
control of the Taliban and after the plane landed there, India had to negotiate
with Taliban officials to reach the hijackers. India's lack of previous contact
with the Taliban regime complicated the negotiation process. Since India had
not officially recognized the Taliban regime, it sent an official from its High
Commission in Islamabad to Kandahar and the United Nations also sent
negotiators. Armed members of the Taliban surrounded the plane, raising doubts
about the Taliban's intent. The Taliban said the army was deployed in an
attempt to prevent the hijackers from killing or injuring the hostages, but
some analysts believe it was done to prevent an Indian military operation
against the kidnappers.
Kathmandu has been a major operational base of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and a center for other illegal activities. Based on later
investigations and statements from others arrested in connection with the
incident, the incident was reportedly planned for more than two months. The
hijackers and their associates made several trips to Kathmandu during this
period. The hijacking was originally planned for December 27, 1999, but was
later postponed. Tickets for the hijackers were booked through three different
means.
Home Minister Advani opposed the release of prisoners in exchange for hostels,
as this would affect public opinion of the government, while Foreign Minister
Jaswant Singh advocated negotiating with the Taliban. On 27 December, the
Indian government sent a team of negotiators led by Vivek Katju, Joint
Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, along with officials Ajit Doval and
CD Sahai.
The Indian officials found that the Taliban had surrounded the plane. The
negotiations did not proceed, as Taliban officials refused to allow Indian
special forces to conduct a covert operation, and also refused to allow their
own special forces to do so. To prevent any military action, Taliban officials
later surrounded the plane with tanks.
On 27 December, a Taliban official speaking to a local newspaper said that the
hijackers should either leave Afghanistan or lay down their arms. Indian
officials interpreted this statement as an understanding that Taliban officials
would arrest the hijackers if they surrendered and began negotiations with them
regarding their demands. The hijackers initially demanded the release of Masood
Azhar, who was lodged in an Indian jail and said that they would release ten
Indians, five foreigners and some other passengers of their choice if the
condition was met. India rejected this offer and said that there would be no
negotiations until all the conditions for a complete end to the hijacking were
settled. On December 27, the hijackers put forth three demands, which included
the release of 36 prisoners lodged in various Indian jails, return of the body
of HuM founder Sajjad Afghani, and US$200 million in cash. Sajjad Afghani was
the founder of HuM who was previously arrested by Indian authorities and killed
during a prison escape in 1999.
In further negotiations, the demand eventually turned to the release of three
prisoners – Masood Azhar, Omar Sheikh and Mushtaq Zargar. Azhar was arrested in
1994 for terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh was arrested in 1994
in connection with the kidnapping of foreigners carried out by the HUA. Zargar,
who had at least three dozen murder cases registered against him, was arrested
on May 15, 1992 and put in jail. On 30 December, RAW chief AS Dulat
communicated with the then chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Farooq
Abdullah, to release prisoners lodged in the state's jails. Abdullah demanded
the release of the prisoners. The Taliban opposed the move, warning Dulat of
long-term consequences, but eventually agreed to the Indian government's
demands. The three prisoners were released and taken to Kandahar.
By then, the hostages had been allowed to disembark from the plane by the
hijackers, and the hijackers also surrendered their weapons to the Taliban.
Passenger statements indicate that the hijackers asked the passengers to
express their gratitude to the Afghanistan government, following which money
was collected and handed over to one of the passengers, Anuj Sharma, who was
instructed to use it to make a souvenir of the hijacking for a museum in
Kandahar. India clearly told the Taliban that it expected the Taliban to arrest
the perpetrators and take action against them. However, instead of arresting
the hijackers and the three prisoners handed over to them, Taliban authorities
gave them ten hours to leave the country and took them to the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Indian Airlines suspended all flights to and from Kathmandu following the
hijacking. The airline resumed its services to Kathmandu under the same flight
number five months later on June 1, 2000, after Nepal assured India of complete
security at Kathmandu's airport. Nepal also agreed to install an additional
X-ray machine at the airport and have final checks of passengers conducted by
Indian security personnel. In January 2000, security at Indian airports was
handed over to the Central Industrial Security Force. The aircraft was returned
to Indian Airlines and was finally scrapped in December 2003.
On December 29, Indian intelligence agencies intercepted a phone call sent from
Pakistan to Abdul Latif in Mumbai. The phone call asked Latif to contact a news
agency in London and tell it that the hijackers would blow up the aircraft if
their demands were not met. The case was being investigated.
Ten people were charged for the hijacking by the Indian Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI), of which the whereabouts of seven, including the five
hijackers, were unknown. The hijacked plane became the main piece of evidence
involved in the subsequent criminal investigation and a model of the plane was
later made for the case.
After nearly eight years of litigation, a special court in Patiala sentenced
the three accused to life imprisonment on 5 February 2008. While the
governments of Nepal and the UAE helped in the investigation, the Pakistan
government refused to cooperate. During the investigation, arrest warrants for
the remaining seven accused, who were Pakistani nationals, were sent to the
Pakistan government by the CBI for their extradition to India. Although the CBI
also took the help of Interpol and got red corner notices issued against the
seven, none of them were eventually prosecuted.
The CBI later moved the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking the death penalty
for Latif. When the case came up for hearing in September 2012, the High Court
rejected the CBI's plea and confirmed the life sentence for Latif. They also
acquitted the other two of convictions under the anti-hijacking law and only
confirmed their convictions under the less stringent Arms Act. The CBI later
approached the Supreme Court of India against this decision.
On 13 September 2012, the Jammu and Kashmir Police arrested Mehrajuddin Dand,
who had allegedly provided logistical support for the hijacking. Meanwhile,
Latif's parole application was rejected in 2015. On 10 July 2020, Latif and 18
others, including a passport office employee, were acquitted by a Mumbai court
sessions of charges related to forging passports in connection with the
hijacking incident.
The incident was seen as a failure of the then BJP government led by Vajpayee.
According to a Firstpost report, then RAW chief AS Dulat had revealed that RAW
officer Shashi Bhushan Singh Tomar was on board the plane during the hijacking.
It believed that the proposal to send the NSG was thwarted by NK Singh, the
then Indian Prime Minister's secretary, whose sister was married to Tomar. It
also said that, according to former RAW officer RK Yadav, Tomar was alerted by
a RAW operative in Kathmandu about a plan by Pakistan-based terrorists to
hijack an Indian plane. However, Tomar rebuked him and asked him not to spread
rumors. It said that somehow Tomar boarded the same plane that was hijacked and
caused the failure of the operation. Media reports also criticized that the
then Prime Minister Vajpayee was kept in the dark for more than an hour after
the hijacking.
In a report to the Indian Parliament on 1 March 2000, Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh said that the government initially did not know that the plan would land
in Amritsar and had limited information about the number of criminals and the
nature of the weapons. He further said that information received from the
flight crew indicated that the attackers had already killed the passengers, and
any action could have contributed to undue risk. Indian authorities made all
efforts to prevent the plane from taking off.
Indian Foreign Policy
Doval, who was part of the negotiating team, called the entire incident a
diplomatic failure, although the same Ajit Doval was also present at the
meeting to demand the release of three terrorists. The terrorists had gone to
Kandahar. India had actively opposed the Taliban regime since it gained power
in Afghanistan in 1996, as they were suspected of being involved in training
terrorists for attacks in the Indian Kashmir region. Although the Taliban had
publicly expressed displeasure over the kidnappings, it did not actively help
India and shared few common interests with the ISI.
While the Taliban and India negotiated to end the kidnappings, it was
considered a setback for India as it was forced to negotiate with the Taliban.
It later supported the Northern Alliance and provided them logistical support
in the fight against the Taliban. Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud visited
India on several occasions to discuss strategies to deal with the Taliban.
During the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, the Indian government
provided intelligence on training camps of Islamic terrorists in Afghanistan.
The three released terrorists and kidnappers are accused in other
terrorism-related incidents such as the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, the
kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002, the 2008
Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Pathankot attack and the 2019 Pulwama attack. Azhar
later founded the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) in 2000, which gained notoriety for
his alleged role in various attacks that led to the deaths of hundreds of
people and armed forces personnel. After his release, Sheikh joined JeM along
with Azhar in 2000. He was later arrested by Pakistani authorities in 2002 for
the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl. He also played a key role in planning
the September 2001 attacks in the United States. Since his release, Zargar has
played an active role in training Islamist militants in Pakistan-administered
Jammu and Kashmir.
Amjad Farooqi, who was previously involved in the kidnapping of Western tourists
in Kashmir by Al-Faran in 1995, was also involved in the hijacking under the
name "Mansoor Hasnain". On 1 March 2022, one of the hijackers, Zahoor
Mistry, was killed in a drive-by shooting in Karachi, Pakistan. Ibrahim was
held responsible for the murder of passenger Rupin Katyal and the gunmen who
killed Ibrahim were never identified.
When the hijacked plane landed in Amritsar, the Bharatiya Janata Party
government at the center and the BJP coalition government in Punjab, along with
a large number of Indian intelligence agencies, diplomats, bureaucrats, NSG,
Punjab police, central forces and political leadership from top to bottom, had
plenty of time to negotiate with the hijackers and not let the plane escape
Indian airspace. They let the opportunity slip away once and for all. After
consulting various reliable sources, it was found that it was true that the
terrorists used pseudonyms to address each other and they knew that they had
more than a week to carry out the entire operation. This was clearly visible
from their comfort zone inside the plane and at various landing sites of the
plane. When the plane lands in Lahore for refueling and the airport lights are
deliberately switched off to swap the hostages despite the hijackers' attempts
to spare some of them, Pakistani authorities come into the picture. Here an
Indian diplomat G Parthasarathy was flown from Islamabad to Lahore airport but
he got stuck in a heavy traffic jam and when he reached Lahore airport, the
plane had already been refueled and was about to leave for some other location.
Shashi Bhushan Singh Tomar, a #RAW station chief in Kathmandu who did not
listen to a credible tip from the second-in-command and could have averted the
entire hijacking, was himself traveling inside the plane to see his ailing wife
(a relative of Natwar Singh). Had his identity been revealed he would have been
killed. Instead of being demoted he was promoted to an easy job in the US.
It was not only Jaswant Singh who took the three freed terrorists to Kandahar
in a chartered plane but India's now much-discussed #spy chief Ajit Kumar Doval
was also with him. The three released terrorists plotted all major terror
attacks in India including 26/11, the Parliament attack, the murder of Wall
Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan and many others. The
Kandahar hijacking is an aspect of Indian politics, diplomacy, strategic,
intelligence and diplomatic sphere that will keep haunting us forever.
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